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337 
COMMENT: THE TIGER WOODS CASE—HAS THE SIXTH 
CIRCUIT ABANDONED TRADEMARK LAW?  ETW CORP. 
V. JIREH PUBLISHING, INC. 
Joseph R. Dreitler∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For more than fifty years, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit vigilantly protected the intellectual property rights of 
trademark owners and persons seeking protection of their privacy and 
rights of publicity.  Less than two years ago, that changed.  In a 
turnaround remarkable for its suddenness and completeness, the court 
veered away from protecting intellectual property rights.  Perhaps the 
reason for the departure lies in the stinging reversals of two of its 
decisions by the United States Supreme Court,1 or perhaps it lies in a 
string of admittedly questionable cases brought by overreaching 
plaintiffs.  Regardless of the reasons, the new precedents are now out 
 
∗ Joseph R. Dreitler is a trademark attorney in Columbus, Ohio.  He wishes to thank his colleagues, 
Mary R. True and Brian J. Downey, for their invaluable assistance with this article. 
Prior to the authors joining their current firm, that firm represented Tiger Woods in the 
Jireh case. 
 1. The Supreme Court’s one-two punch at Sixth Circuit intellectual property decisions came 
in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) and Moseley v. V Secret 
Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).  In TrafFix, the Sixth Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court’s 
test in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson, 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995), for determining whether trade dress is 
functional, and therefore, not protectable.  TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 27-28.  The Sixth Circuit found the 
two-spring device used on traffic construction signs to enable them to flex in the wind to be non-
functional.  Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1335 (6th Cir. 1999).  The 
Supreme Court reversed, informing the Sixth Circuit that it had “misinterpreted” the Qualitex 
language.  TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32. 
In Moseley, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit’s holding that Moseley’s use of the term 
“Victor’s Little Secret” on a retail store selling sex toys diluted the Victoria’s Secret trademark.  537 
U.S. at 434.  Ignoring the legislative history of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, and its reason 
for being (to prevent a famous mark from being weakened, diluted or tarnished by unrelated third 
party uses), the Supreme Court held that proving dilution requires a plaintiff to show that the 
diluting term has already caused actual harm to its trademark.  Id. at 433. 
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there and plaintiffs everywhere must think twice about bringing a 
trademark case in the Sixth Circuit. 
The Sixth Circuit should not be proud of its legal reasoning and 
analysis in the 2003 decision ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.2 
(hereinafter “Tiger Woods”3).  In a 2-1 decision, the Sixth Circuit held 
that it was perfectly acceptable for an “artist” to use Tiger Woods’ image 
and highly-marketable persona to generate 250 serigraphs and 5,000 
lithographs featuring Woods in a pose that is strikingly similar to a 
poster of Woods that is licensed to and sold by Nike.  The stated 
rationale for this decision was an inexplicable reliance on the First 
Amendment—and nearly no citation to the entire body of unfair 
competition, trademark or right of publicity law—to justify the 
defendant’s outright commercial misappropriation of Woods’ persona 
and right of publicity. 
To truly appreciate the complete about-face represented by Tiger 
Woods, a review of prior Sixth Circuit precedent is necessary. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Sixth Circuit and the Law of Unfair Competition 
 
Even before the enactment of the Lanham Act4 in 1946, the 
common law of unfair competition was highly developed in the Sixth 
Circuit and elsewhere.  As early as 1934, in Chesebrough Manufacturing 
Co. v. Old Gold Chemical Co.,5 the Sixth Circuit set out the basis for 
recognizing and distinguishing unfair competition from trademark 
infringement: 
It is not contended that the [defendant] has so closely simulated 
plaintiff’s trade-marks as to amount to infringement . . . .  The 
contention is that it has so simulated in coloring and marking the caps, 
cartons, and labels of the appellant as to mislead the purchasing public.  
Simulation amounting to unfair competition does not reside in identity 
of single features of dress or markings nor in indistinguishability when 
the articles are set side by side, but is to be tested by the general 
impression made by the offending article upon the eye of the ordinary 
purchaser or user.  If the general impression which it makes when seen 
alone is such is such as is likely to lead the ordinary purchaser to 
believe it to be the original article, there is an unlawful simulation. . . . 
 
 2. 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 3. Id. at 918 (showing that “ETW” stands for Eldrick (Tiger) Woods). 
 4. Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141 (2005). 
 5. 70 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 599 (1934). 
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol38/iss2/2
DREITLER1.DOC 3/7/2005  11:08 AM 
2005] THE TIGER WOODS CASE 339 
It is true that [defendant] places on its article distinguishing marks by 
which it could be identified by a careful and discriminating purchaser, 
but this is not enough, for it is the casual or ordinary purchaser who 
must be protected . . . .6 
1.  The Moral Underpinnings of the Law of Unfair Competition 
 
Cases from the early part of the last century emphasize the moral 
nature—in essence, the “unfairness”—of practices prohibited under the 
common law of unfair competition.  For example, in the Second 
Circuit’s 1910 decision by Judge Coxe in Florence Manufacturing Co. 
v. J. C. Dowd & Co.,7 the Court reasoned: 
It is so easy for the honest business man, who wishes to sell his goods 
upon their merits, to select from the entire material universe, which is 
before him, symbols, marks and coverings which by no possibility can 
cause confusion between his goods and those of his competitors, that 
the courts look with suspicion upon one who, in dressing his goods for 
the market, approaches so near to his successful rival that the public 
may fail to distinguish between them.8 
Likewise, in American Chiclet Co. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 9 
the Second Circuit restrained the defendant from using a package similar 
to plaintiff’s Chiclets.  Judge Learned Hand wrote: 
It would be absurd to see in this anything but a hope to bring to its own 
net just those buyers who are on the fringe of the plaintiff’s customers. 
 . . . [A]s soon as we see that a second comer in a market has, for no 
reason that he can assign, plagiarized the ‘make-up’ of an earlier 
comer, we need no more; for he at any rate thinks that any differentia 
he adds will not, or at least may not, prevent the diversion and we are 
content to accept his forecast that he is ‘likely’ to succeed.10 
Subsequent to passage of the Federal Trademark (Lanham) Act of 
1946, cases from the Sixth Circuit continued to follow this line of 
reasoning, focusing on the intent of the alleged infringer.  The court took 
businesses to task when their actions crossed over the line from fair to 
unfair competition.  The sense of moral outrage continued.  Courts 
everywhere looked to the legislative history of the Lanham Act to 
conclude that Congress intended to fashion a federal remedy against the 
 
 6. Id. at 384–85 (internal citations omitted). 
 7. 178 F. 73 (2d Cir. 1910). 
 8. Id. at 75. 
 9. 208 F.2d 560 (2d  Cir. 1953). 
 10. Id. at 562-63. 
3
Dreitler: The Tiger Woods Case
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005
DREITLER1.DOC 3/7/2005  11:08 AM 
340 AKRON LAW REVIEW [38:337 
kind of unfair competition that the common law had effectively 
protected.  Thus, in Federated-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff,11  
the Sixth Circuit noted that the purpose of the Lanham Act was to 
“eliminate deceitful practices in interstate commerce involving the 
misuse of trademarks, but along with this it sought to eliminate other 
forms of misrepresentations which are of the same general character 
even though they do not involve any use of what can technically be 
called a trade-mark.”12 
In the important 1982 case of Frisch’s Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby’s 
Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc.,13 the Sixth Circuit found that § 43(a) 
“created a sui generis federal statutory cause of action for ‘false 
representation.’”14  In Frisch’s, the court enjoined a former franchisee of 
the Big Boy restaurant chain in Ohio from engaging in advertising which 
came across the West Virginia border into Ohio, finding that: 
Frisch’s primary concern is that Ohio consumers will assume that all 
Elby’s restaurants, including the Ohio Elby’s, sell food which is 
sponsored by or originates from the Big Boy chain of restaurants.  This 
court previously concluded that false representations about the origin 
of source or manufacture of goods are prohibited by the false 
designation of origin clause of § 43(a). (False) representations of the 
source of a product constitute the common-law tort of [‘]unfair 
competition,’ or, as it is otherwise known, [‘]passing off.[‘]15 
One year later, Judge Rubin, of the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Ohio in Cincinnati, also relied on § 43(a) to 
sustain a federal cause of action for the common law tort of passing off, 
and re-emphasized the moral underpinnings of the law of unfair 
competition.  In  Kroger Co. v. Johnson & Johnson,16 Kroger sought a 
declaratory judgment that their acetaminophen products did not infringe 
or compete unfairly with the Johnson & Johnson’s “Tylenol” name and 
trade dress.  Kroger had adopted three different trademarks, Actenol, 
Supernol and Hydranol, as well as similar color combinations to those of 
Tylenol, for its house brands.  Moreover, and of crucial importance to 
 
 11. 313 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963). 
 12. Id. at 409.  It was not until the passage of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 
(hereinafter “TLRA”) that the definition of “trademark” was revised to clearly encompass trade 
dress.  Id. 
 13. 670 F.2d 642 (6th Cir. 1982). 
 14. Id. at 646, (quoting Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 
659, 702, 212 U.S.P.Q. 904, 910-11 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
 15. Id. at 646-47 (citations omitted). 
 16. 570 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
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Judge Rubin’s analysis, evidence was introduced that Kroger 
intentionally chose color combinations that were “reminiscent” of the 
famous Tylenol trade dress, and Johnson & Johnson also introduced a 
survey that indicated both likelihood of confusion and a belief that 
Kroger’s products were manufactured by Tylenol.17 
Not surprisingly, at least at that point in time, the court found 
Kroger’s use of the Tylenol color combinations was not accidental, and 
that Kroger had intentionally traded off Tylenol’s name and trade 
dress.18  Repeating a theme, Judge Rubin once again looked to the 
congressional intent of the Lanham Act, quoting the Act itself, “the 
intent of this Chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of 
Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of 
marks in such commerce . . . [and] to protect persons engaged in such 
commerce against unfair competition . . . .”19 
 
Judge Rubin then concluded: 
While nursery rhymes have no known precedential value, they 
frequently contain concepts of inherent wisdom.  This case is somehow 
reminiscent of the plight of the Little Red Hen whose friends declined 
to plant, harvest or thresh the wheat; grind or bake the flour, but were 
all too ready to share with her the bread that resulted.20 
2.  The Role of the Defendant’s Intent 
 
The Kroger decision also illustrates the continuing importance of 
intent in the courts’ analyses of trademark infringement and unfair 
competition cases at this time.  As discussed infra, the moral 
underpinnings of unfair competition law are well-established.  Indeed, 
over the years, many district courts in the Sixth Circuit have found that 
an intent to trade off someone else’s name, trademark, or investment 
should be prohibited—whether or not the activity strictly fell within the 
Lanham Act or common law of unfair competition. 
 
 17. See id. at 1057 n.4. 
The following dialogue occurred during opening statement of counsel for the plaintiffs: 
THE COURT: ‘. . .  you have selected intentionally the color combination of Tylenol.  Is 
that correct?’ 
MR. DOOLEY [Counsel for plaintiffs]: ‘That is correct. It is similar.  It was definitely 
intended to be reminiscent . . . .’ 
Id. at 1057 n.4. 
 18. Id. at 1059. 
 19. Id. at 1058 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1983)) (emphasis added by the court). 
 20. Id. at 1060. 
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For example, in the 1983 case of Wendy’s International, Inc. v. Big 
Bite, Inc.,21 Judge Duncan enjoined the defendant restaurant chain’s TV 
commercials which featured a pigtailed, freckle faced girl who had been 
dressed and made up to look like Wendy’s Restaurants’ famous “Little 
Wendy.”22  In the Big Bite commercial lampooning Wendy’s, Big Bite’s 
ersatz “Little Wendy” smiles and says, “ain’t no reason to go any place 
but Big Bite.”23 
Judge Duncan did not agree that this was an acceptable parody of 
Wendy’s well-known advertising slogan.  Rather, the court found that 
even though Big Bite’s commercial did not misrepresent or make false 
statements, Big Bite failed to rebut the inference of consumer confusion 
created by its intentional use of Wendy’s trademarks.24  Thus, the court 
granted the injunctive relief sought.25  In closing, referring to the issuing 
injunction, Judge Duncan said, “ain’t no reason to do anything else.”26 
Likewise, in the 1987 decision, Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Pizza Caesar, Inc.,27 the Court considered the defendant’s intent as the 
primary element in its likelihood of confusion analysis: 
Proof of intent to appropriate another’s property may be comparable to 
an expression of opinion by an expert witness; a defendant who 
purposely chooses a particular mark because it is similar to that of a 
senior user is saying, in effect, that he thinks there is at least a 
possibility that he can divert some business from the senior user — and 
the defendant ought to know at least as much about the likelihood of 
confusion as the trier of fact.28 
Throughout the early 1990s, the Sixth Circuit continued to look to 
the defendant’s intent as a critical factor in its analysis in determining 
both likelihood of confusion and whether the line between fair and 
unfair competition had been crossed.  In the 1991 decision Ferrari 
S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili E Corse v. Roberts,29 the court 
found that the exterior design features of plaintiff’s “Daytona Spyder” 
and “Testarossa” sports cars constituted trade dress which had acquired 
secondary meaning, which was further bolstered by the fact that the 
 
 21. 576 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
 22. Id. at 825. 
 23. Id. at 818. 
 24. See id. at 822-23. 
 25. Id. at 825. 
 26. Id. at 825. 
 27. 834 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 28. Id. at 572. 
 29. 944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991). 
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol38/iss2/2
DREITLER1.DOC 3/7/2005  11:08 AM 
2005] THE TIGER WOODS CASE 343 
defendant had intentionally copied the designs.30  The court therefore 
held that confusion was likely between plaintiff’s cars and defendant’s 
replica cars.31 
In the 1996 case of Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. Champions Golf 
Club, Inc.,32 the Court once again found intent very relevant to its 
likelihood of confusion analysis.33  In the Champions case, a group of 
golfers in Lexington, Kentucky built a world-class golf course and 
adopted the name “Champions Golf Club.”  They were sued for 
infringement by the well-known 30 year old Champions Golf Club of 
Houston, Texas.  The Sixth Circuit reversed a lower court finding of no 
infringement, and remanded the case, focusing on the intent factor, and 
quoting its 1988 Wynn Oil34 decision, “[a]lthough intentional 
infringement is not necessary for a finding of likely confusion, the 
presence of that factor strengthens the likelihood of confusion.”35 
In 1997, the Sixth Circuit was presented with another case that 
suggested the defendant had knowledge of the plaintiff’s registered BIG 
DADDY’S trademark when it adopted its similar mark.  In Daddy’s 
Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy’s Family Music Center,36 the 
court looked at the evidence showing intentional copying and concluded, 
“[i]f a party chooses a mark with the intent of causing confusion, that 
fact alone may be sufficient to justify an inference of confusing 
similarity.”37 
Thus, over fifty years of Sixth Circuit precedent demonstrated the 
court’s recognition that trademark owners deserved protection in 
situations where the evidence showed the infringer’s actions were 
intentional.38 
 
 30. Id. at 1240. 
 31. Id. 
 32. 78 F.3d 1111 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 33. See id. at 1121. 
 34. Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1988). 
 35. Champions Golf, 78 F.3d at 1121 (emphasis added).  On remand, the district court was 
directed to make a specific finding with regard to the intent factor.  Id.  A finding of intentional 
infringement would be significant in that it would show that the Kentucky club intended to 
capitalize on the mark that it did not own, and that the Kentucky club believed confusion was likely.  
Id. 
 36. 109 F.3d 275 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 37. Id. at 285 (quoting Homeowners Group Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 
1100, 1111 (6th Cir. 1991)) (emphasis added). 
 38. In another setback for plaintiffs, the Sixth Circuit has also begun the retreat on intentional 
copying, by noting that “intentional copying . . . is not actionable under the Lanham Act absent 
evidence that the copying was done with the intent to derive a benefit from the reputation of 
another.”  DeGidio v. West Group Corp., 355 F.3d 506, 514 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing DeGidio v. West 
Group Corp., 191 F. Supp 2d 904, 917 (N.D. Ohio 2002)) (ellipsis in original).  District Courts have 
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B.  Legal Recognition and Development of the Right of Publicity 
 
As early as 1953, the Second Circuit recognized the right of 
publicity in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.39  In 
Haelan, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant, another chewing gum 
company, had induced professional baseball players to breach their 
contracts with plaintiff.40  Although the defendant contended that any 
contract that the baseball players had with plaintiff was merely a release 
that protected plaintiff from liability for violating the players’ right of 
privacy, the Second Circuit took a broader view in recognizing the 
commercial value of a famous person’s persona: 
This right might be called a ‘right of publicity.’ For it is common 
knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-
players), far from having their feelings bruised through public 
exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no 
longer received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing 
their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains 
and subways.  This right of publicity would usually yield them no 
money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which 
barred any other advertiser from using their pictures.41 
Seven years later, William Prosser’s breakthrough article Privacy 
organized the right of privacy doctrine into four torts, the last being 
“identity appropriation,” or the appropriation of another’s name or 
likeness.42  This cause of action protected both commercial and personal 
interests.43  The commercial aspect of the tort of “identity appropriation” 
became known as the right of publicity. 
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the right 
of publicity in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.44  The 
Court held that defendant violated the common law rights of Hugo 
Zacchini, known professionally as the “Human Cannonball,” by secretly 
taping his performance and then broadcasting it on the evening news.  
 
interpreted this to mean that intentional copying alone is not sufficient to prove secondary meaning.  
Carlton-Sud Indus. LLC v. Plastics Group, Inc., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d 1826, 1828 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 
 39. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). 
 40. Id. at 869. 
 41. Id. at 868. 
 42. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
 43. Id.  The other types delineated by Dean Prosser are: (1) intrusion upon one’s seclusion or 
solitude, (2) “public disclosure of embarrassing private facts,” and (3) publicity which places one in 
a false light.  Id. 
 44. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
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Significantly, the Zacchini Court noted that the defendant’s reliance on 
the First Amendment did not trump Zacchini’s commercial interests: 
There is no doubt that entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First 
Amendment protection.  It is also true that entertainment itself can be 
important news.  But it is important to note that neither the public nor 
respondent will be deprived of the benefit of petitioner’s performance 
as long as his commercial stake in his act is appropriately recognized.  
Petitioner does not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his performance; he 
simply wants to be paid for it.45 
The Ohio Supreme Court recognized in Zacchini that, under 
common law, “[o]ne who appropriates to his own use or benefit the 
name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for 
invasion of his privacy, and the use or benefit need not necessarily be 
commercial.”46  Thus, Ohio law prohibits the publication of another’s 
name or likeness in a commercial use that draws from that person’s 
“reputation, prestige, or other value associated with him, for purposes of 
publicity.”47 
The Sixth Circuit subsequently acknowledged that a celebrity’s 
identity can be valuable in the promotion of products, and that a 
celebrity has an interest that may be protected from the unauthorized 
commercial exploitation.  In Memphis Development Foundation v. 
Factors Etc., Inc.,48 a case involving the right of publicity of the late 
Elvis Presley, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that, “[t]he famous have 
an exclusive legal right during life to control and profit from the 
commercial use of their name and personality.”49 
In 1983, the Sixth Circuit applied its intent-based unfair 
competition analysis to the common law right of publicity in Carson v. 
Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.50  The suit was based on claims 
arising from the defendant’s adoption of the phrase “Here’s Johnny,” a 
phrase undeniably associated with the well-known comedian and 
Tonight Show host Johnny Carson, to identify its portable toilets.  The 
Sixth Circuit majority agreed that while there was no likelihood of 
confusion or infringement, Carson’s right of publicity had been violated 
by use of “Here’s Johnny” on a portable toilet because the defendant 
 
 45. Id. at 578 (citation omitted). 
 46. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, syllabus point 1 
(1976), rev’d on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
 47. Id. at 230 n.4. 
 48. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). 
 49. Id. at 957. 
 50. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983). 
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intentionally - and admittedly - appropriated his identity for commercial 
exploitation.51 
 
C.  The Tide Begins to Turn 
 
Despite its longstanding tradition of recognizing and enforcing 
trademark rights, the Sixth Circuit, in 1998, began to swing in the 
opposite direction.  In a 2-1 decision in Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & 
Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Productions,52 the Sixth Circuit reversed a trial 
court’s holding that a photographer who took photographs of the Rock & 
Roll Hall of Fame, produced posters, labeled them as such, and sold 
them in competition with similar posters sold by the Hall, had not 
violated the Hall’s trademark rights in its very distinctive building 
design.53  There was evidence that the I.M. Pei-designed building had 
been arbitrarily designed for protection from imitation. 
The Rock & Roll Hall of Fame majority attempted to justify the 
defendant’s intentional use of another’s property by stating that the 
building was fanciful, but not in a trademark sense.54  The court then 
reasoned that because the entire building was not protected with 
trademark registrations depicting the structure from every imaginable 
angle, posters of the building from any angle were not protectable, and 
the use of the registered trademark “Rock ‘N Roll Hall of Fame” on the 
poster was deemed “fair use.”55 
The majority opinion in Rock & Roll Hall of Fame was poorly 
written and ignored not only a survey that indicated considerable 
confusion between identical products, but evidence of a clearly-
demonstrated intent by the defendant to profit from its appropriation of 
the plaintiff’s property.  Rather than attempting to distinguish earlier 
Sixth Circuit precedent, it relied upon the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc.56 to argue that the defendant’s photographs of 
the Rock & Roll Hall of Fame did not indicate origin.57  However, as 
 
 51. Id. at 837. 
 52. 134 F.3d 749 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 53. Id. at 756. 
 54. Id. at 754.  Somewhat surprisingly, the Court did not even mention its prior decision in 
White Tower System, Inc. v. White Castle System of Eating Houses Corp., 90 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 
1937) (holding that White Castle had exclusive rights to its style of building), even though the trial 
court in Rock & Roll Hall of Fame relied upon White Tower in issuing its preliminary injunction 
enjoining the defendant’s sale of posters.  Id. at 754-55. 
 55. Id. at 755-56. 
 56. 894 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 57. See Rock & Roll Hall of Fame, 134 F.3d at 755. 
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will be seen, the Pirone case was completely distinguishable, as well as 
not on point with Rock & Roll Hall of Fame or Tiger Woods. 
Pirone was a trademark infringement and unfair competition case 
brought by the licensing agent for baseball legend Babe Ruth’s 
daughters.  The defendant published The 1988 MacMillan Baseball 
Engagement Calendar, a weekly appointment calendar, in which each 
week’s page included a photograph of a baseball player, baseball field, 
or other items of interest to baseball fans.  Only two of the 52 weeks had 
photographs of Babe Ruth, and a third week was a photograph of a 
baseball bearing Ruth’s signature.  The Second Circuit found that the 
two photographs of Babe Ruth were used only to identify a great 
baseball player, and were not an indicator of source.58  The overall 
theme was a baseball calendar—not a Babe Ruth calendar.59  Thus, 
because there was no trademark use of Babe Ruth, the court concluded 
that there was no infringement.60 
The Pirone court noted that while the § 43(a) unfair competition 
claim was much broader than the trademark infringement claim, the two 
photographs of Ruth, like the calendar’s back cover picture of Jackie 
Robinson, and the dozens of other baseball pictures were merely 
descriptive of the theme of the calendar, and in neither case would a 
consumer believe that Ruth or Robinson sponsored the calendar.61  
Rather, the Second Circuit reasoned, the source of the publication was 
clearly indicated by the numerous, prominent references to its publisher, 
MacMillan.62  Nevertheless, even though the use of the photographs in 
Pirone was completely different than the use of the photograph to sell a 
poster in Rock & Roll Hall of Fame, the Sixth Circuit’s unfortunate and 
improper reliance on the case set the court on the course that eventually 
lead to the even more unfortunate Tiger Woods decision. 
 
D.  The Tiger Woods Decision 
 
1.  Facts 
 
In Tiger Woods, the defendant produced a painting depicting 
Eldrick “Tiger” Woods after his first Masters tournament championship 
entitled “The Masters of Augusta.”  In addition to the painting, however, 
 
 58. Pirone, 894 F.2d at 583. 
 59. Id. at 584. 
 60. Id. at 583. 
 61. Id. at 584. 
 62. Id. 
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the defendant also produced 250 serigraphs and 5,000 lithographs, all of 
which had the name “Tiger Woods” on the container, and were produced 
for commercial sale.  The painting and prints were very similar to a 
poster of Woods sold by Nike under license from Woods.63 
Woods sued the artist Jireh for trademark infringement, unfair 
competition, deceptive trade practices, and violation of Ohio’s common 
law right of publicity.64  Woods produced an unrefuted consumer survey 
that showed 62 percent source confusion as to the sponsorship of the 
poster, and the evidence was undeniable that defendant had intentionally 
reproduced Wood’s likeness for commercial profit.65  Nevertheless, 
Woods lost on summary judgment.66 
 
2.  The Court’s Analysis 
 
The majority’s decision completely ignored long-standing Sixth 
Circuit precedent on intent, the survey showing actual confusion, and the 
Supreme Court’s Zacchini decision.  Instead, the majority relied in part 
upon dissents from other circuits, it misstated the holdings of virtually 
every case it cited, and ignored the vast difference in the facts and law 
between the cases it cited and those in Tiger Woods. 
First, the Sixth Circuit held, “as a general rule, a person’s image or 
likeness cannot function as a trademark.  Our conclusion is supported by 
the decisions of other courts which have addressed this issue.”67  As has 
been demonstrated, however, the primary case the court relied upon as 
support for this remarkable assertion, Pirone, simply does not stand for 
that proposition.68 
The Sixth Circuit also relied heavily on the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Rogers v. Grimaldi69 to support its contention that a person’s 
 
 63. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 918-19 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 64. Id. at 919.  While Ohio now has a right of publicity statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §  2741, 
et. Seq (2005)., at the time the case was brought the statute had not been enacted and Tiger Woods 
relied upon the common law right of publicity that had been developed through such cases as 
Zacchini and Carson.  Id. 
 65. Id. at 942. 
 66. Id. at 919. 
 67. Id. at 922.  The Court’s finding that this is a “general rule” is perplexing as it has long 
been recognized that a person’s image, such as “Colonel” Sanders for food, beverages and 
restaurant services and Fred Rogers for publications, just to name a few, can clearly be registered 
and function as trademarks.  See Federal TM Reg. No. 806,104 (issued Mar. 22, 1966); Federal TM 
Reg. No. 2,280,908 (issued Sep. 28, 1999). 
 68. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text (discussing Pirone). 
 69. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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likeness or name cannot function as a trademark.70  In that decision, the 
Second Circuit concluded that the use of “Ginger and Fred” as the title 
of a motion picture about two fictional Italian cabaret performers did not 
constitute trademark infringement, because the film made no further 
reference to Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers, and because there was no 
evidence that the film’s patrons were confused.71  As additional support, 
the Sixth Circuit then looked to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Mattel, 
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.72  That case, brought by Mattel, owners of the 
Barbie trademark, alleged infringement based upon a song titled “Barbie 
Girl.”  The song, an unflattering parody of the values the songwriter 
believed the Barbie doll represents, clearly was in no danger of being 
viewed as endorsed by Mattel, the Ninth Circuit concluded.73 
More importantly, however, both of these cases deal with using a 
third party’s trademark only as a title to artistic works that clearly do not 
suggest any endorsement by or association with the person (or icon) 
named.  As Judge Kozinski, the author of the Mattel decision, noted, 
If a pair of dancing shoes had been labeled Ginger and Fred, a dancer 
might have suspected that Rogers was associated with the shoes (or at 
least one of them), just as Michael Jordan has endorsed Nike sneakers 
that claim to make you fly through the air.  But Ginger and Fred was 
not a brand of shoe; it was the title of a movie and, for the reasons 
explained by the Second Circuit, deserved to be treated differently.74 
Clearly, the cases involving titles to songs or films have no 
relevance to Tiger Woods, in which the defendant’s entire product was 
Tiger Woods, not just the title.  And even though the courts in both the 
“Fred and Ginger” and “Barbie” decisions recognized the need to 
balance any claim of “artistic use” with the trademark owner’s rights and 
the need to avoid confusion, the Sixth Circuit ignored this basic principle 
of trademark and unfair competition law.75 
After determining that a person’s name or image could not function 
as a trademark, the Sixth Circuit then proceeded to decimate its 
longstanding precedents on unfair competition law.  In the face of clear 
evidence that the defendant’s more than 5,000 copies of Tiger Woods 
prints were produced for commercial distribution,76 the court nonetheless 
 
 70. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 920, 926-27. 
 71. See generally Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 72. 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 73. Id. at 902. 
 74. Id. at 901-02. 
 75. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d at 906; Pirone, 894 F.2d at 583-94. 
 76. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 919.  The evidence showed that the serigraphs of the Tiger 
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determined that the defendant was entitled to the full protection of the 
First Amendment.  The court did not even conclude that the Tiger 
Woods prints constituted only commercial speech.77 
For support, the Sixth Circuit looked to questionable California 
cases, starting with Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,78 a Ninth 
Circuit decision in which, unremarkably, Dustin Hoffman failed in a 
right of publicity claim under state law against the monthly Los Angeles 
Magazine that had used a computer generated picture of Hoffman in an 
article that featured several famous movie stars in digitally-altered 
photographs.  In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that the Hoffman 
picture was entitled to First Amendment protection because of the 
“significant transformative elements” of the photograph and because the 
article was not attempting to trade off the various celebrities depicted 
therein for commercial gain.79 
Continuing on with its inexplicable reliance on California case law, 
the Sixth Circuit then discussed Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary 
Saderup, Inc.,80 a California Supreme Court case that actually supports 
Tiger Woods’ claim.  In that decision, the California Supreme Court was 
asked to determine whether the sale of lithographs and t-shirts bearing 
the likenesses of the Three Stooges violated their heirs’ right of publicity 
under California law.  The California court flatly rejected a claim that 
the doctrine of “fair use” be imported into the law of right of publicity, 
and the court then developed its own “transformative test,”81 which was 
approved by the Sixth Circuit in Tiger Woods.82 
The California court found that when an artist’s skill and talent is 
subordinated to the overall goal of creating a conventional portrait of a 
celebrity so as to commercially exploit his or her fame, then the artist’s 
right of free expression is outweighed by the celebrity’s right of 
publicity.83  In finding that the artist had violated the rights of publicity 
of Larry, Curly, and Moe’s heirs, the court noted that the marketability 
and economic value of an artist’s work derives primarily from the fame 
of the celebrities depicted.84  As the court noted: 
 
Woods painting sold for $700, and the lithographs were priced at $100 each.  Id. 
 77. Id. at 925. 
 78. 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 79. Id. at 1184 n.2, 1186. 
 80. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001) 
 81. Id. at 808. 
 82. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 936. 
 83. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808. 
 84. Id. at 808-09. 
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Another way of stating the inquiry is whether the celebrity likeness is 
one of the “raw materials” from which an original work is synthesized, 
or whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum 
and substance of the work in question.  We ask, in other words, 
whether a product containing a celebrity’s likeness is so transformed 
that it has become primarily the defendant’s own expression rather 
than the celebrity’s likeness.  And when we use the word “expression,” 
we mean expression of something other than the likeness of the 
celebrity.85 
Undaunted by the fact that the Woods lithographs were, like the 
Three Stooges, “the very sum and substance of the work in question,”86 
the Sixth Circuit concluded that the defendant’s knock off lithographs fit 
within the test—they were transformative and the First Amendment 
totally and completely obliterated any claim of unfair competition.87 
 
3.  The Dissent 
 
Judge Clay wrote a stinging dissent to the majority opinion that not 
only questioned the majority’s reasoning, but called to task its sweeping 
and incorrect holding that a person’s likeness could not function as a 
trademark.88  Judge Clay also expressed his dismay at the majority for its 
failure to even consider Woods’ survey showing significant source 
confusion, even though the majority had cited Second Circuit law that 
required a balancing of the likelihood of confusion factors when artistic 
works are involved.89  The dissent also noted that while the majority had 
relied heavily on the California Supreme Court’s “transformative” test 
set forth in the Three Stooges decision, it had completely ignored the 
fact that the California court had specifically cited to Zacchini, the Ohio 
human cannonball case, to emphasize that: 
 
 85. Id. at 809.  The California Supreme Court also questioned the decision of the lower court 
in the Tiger Woods decision, ETW. Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g,, Inc., 99 F. Supp 2d 829, 835-836 (N.D. 
Ohio 2000), stating: 
[T]he court held that a painting consisting of a montage of likenesses of the well-known 
professional golfer Eldridge [sic] “Tiger” Woods, reproduced in 5,000 prints, was a work 
of art and therefore protected under the First Amendment. We disagree with the ETW 
Corp. court if its holding is taken to mean that any work of art, however much it 
trespasses on the right of publicity and however much it lacks additional creative 
elements, is categorically shielded from liability by the First Amendment. 
Id. at 809 n.11. 
 86. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809 (Cal. 2001). 
 87. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 938. 
 88. See id. at 922. 
 89. Id. at 945, 945 n.1. 
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[T]he state’s interest in preventing the outright misappropriation of 
such intellectual property by others is not automatically trumped by the 
interest in free expression or dissemination of information; rather, as in 
the case of defamation, the state law interest and the interest in free 
expression must be balanced, according to the relative importance of 
the interests at stake.90 
The dissent further noted that “[t]he majority’s failure to [allow a 
jury to decide if the evidence of confusion is sufficient to find liability] 
is in complete contravention to the intent of Congress, the principles of 
trademark law, and the well-established body of jurisprudence in this 
area,”91 and succinctly concluded that “. . . the majority’s analysis not 
only fails in its disjointed approach but in its outcome as well.”92 
III.  DISCUSSION—HOW DID WE GET HERE? 
Why did it happen?  In the words of Pogo, we have met the enemy 
and he is us!  After the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in Two Pesos 
that trade dress should be treated like any other type of trademark,93 and 
its 1995 decision in Qualitex that a color could be protected as a 
trademark,94 the lower courts were deluged with trademark claims 
seeking to protect arguably functional products and features that clearly 
did not function as trademarks. 
Judge Posner expressed his frustration in Publications 
International, Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc.,95 a case where the plaintiff claimed 
trade dress rights in the paper, binding and gilding of a cook book: 
[A] seller should be encouraged to make his products recognizable by 
consumers at a glance as his product and not that of another seller. . . .  
On the other hand, a seller should not be allowed to obtain in the name 
of trade dress a monopoly over the elements of a product’s appearance 
that either are not associated with a particular producer or that have 
value to consumers that is independent of identification.96 
Every circuit was seeing its own Landoll case and they did not like 
what they were seeing.  Many of these cases were brought by companies 
whose patents were expiring.  In an effort to extend the life of the patent, 
 
 90. Comedy III, 21 P.3d  at 806. 
 91. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 960. 
 92. Id. at 951-52. 
 93. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 763 (1992). 
 94. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995). 
 95. 164 F.3d 337 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 96. Id. at 339. 
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trade dress claims were made near the end of the patent term with little 
or no evidence that the product design was promoted as a trademark.  
Not surprisingly, the courts were not amenable to lawyers attempting to 
misuse trademark law to prevent competition. 
Perhaps in response to this new wave of questionable trademark 
cases, Congress passed the Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act 
(hereinafter “TLT”) in 1998 without any real debate.  The TLT amended 
the Lanham Act so that: (1) incontestable registrations are subject to 
cancellation at any time on the grounds of functionality; and (2) 
functionality may be asserted as a defense to an infringement suit, even 
as to an incontestable registration.97  Then, in 2000, the Supreme Court 
decided Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc.,98 in which the court 
held unanimously that in an action for infringement of unregistered trade 
dress under § 43(a), a product’s design is distinctive, and therefore 
protectable, only upon a showing of secondary meaning.99 
The Supreme Court was certainly sending a message in 2000 with 
the Wal-Mart decision: it would no longer countenance reliance on Two 
Pesos100 and Qualitex for plaintiffs alleging trade dress protection under 
the Lanham Act for product features that had never been promoted as 
trademarks, and had never been recognized by the public as being 
indicators of source. 
Regrettably, and in a remarkably tone-deaf decision, given the 
overall climate of the courts, the Sixth Circuit then decided the TrafFix 
case.101  In that decision, the Sixth Circuit found that springs on a road 
construction sign, which were once the subject of patent protection, 
could be source identifying and thus be eligible for trademark 
protection.102  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and in 2001 
resoundingly reversed the Sixth Circuit’s decision 9-0.103 
More significantly, however, the Supreme Court’s decision created 
an incredibly expansive definition of functionality that had originally 
appeared in a footnote in the 1982 decision, Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. 
Ives Laboratories, Inc.: “[i]n general terms, a product feature is 
functional [and cannot serve as a trademark] if it is essential to the use or 
 
 97. Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act of 1998, PUB.L. NO. 105-330, 112 Stat. 3064 
(amending various sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1126) (Oct. 30, 1998). 
 98. 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
 99. Id. at 216. 
 100. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
 101. Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 2000), rev’d, 532 
U.S. 23 (2001). 
 102. See id. at 938-41. 
 103. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
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purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.”104  
Thus, in overruling the Sixth Circuit’s decision in TrafFix, the Supreme 
Court found that once it had been established that the dual spring design 
of the road sign was functional, the Sixth Circuit was wrong to continue 
with further analysis – the design could never be protected as trade 
dress.105 
Then in March 2003, the Supreme Court again reversed the Sixth 
Circuit 9-0 in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue,106 a dilution decision that 
can charitably be described as superficial, particularly when contrasted 
with the Sixth Circuit’s thorough analysis of the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act in its overturned decision of V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. 
Moseley.107  In light of these two Supreme Court decisions reversing 
Sixth Circuit decisions 9-0, could there have been discussion among the 
Tiger Woods panel about whether the Sixth Circuit wanted a third trip in 
three years to the Supreme Court on a trademark case? If so, that is 
regrettable.  But it is wrong to lay the blame for the Sixth Circuit’s 
caution solely on the marble steps of the high court.  We lawyers must 
take part of the blame for the Sixth Circuit’s skepticism in its current 
approach to trademark and right of publicity law. 
Even after Tiger Woods was handed down in September of 2003,108 
lawyers appeared before the Sixth Circuit to argue that the spine cover of 
a scrapbook album with a dual strap hinge design that permitted pages to 
lie flat when turned, a spine cover concealing a dual strap hinge and a 
laminated padded album cover with ribbed edges for reinforcement were 
trademarks entitled to trade dress protection under § 43(a).109  In 
affirming the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Ohio, the Sixth Circuit was compelled to re-state the obvious — that 
purely functional items that were neither promoted nor recognized as 
trademarks are not eligible for trademark protection.110  The larger issue, 
however, is why this case was even appealed to the Sixth Circuit in light 
of the TrafFix and Wal-Mart decisions, as well as the 1998 amendment 
 
 104. 456 U. S. 844, 850, n.10 (1982).  Inwood was a case that did not even decide 
functionality.  Id.  The footnote “test” came back out of the closet in TrafFix.  See TrafFix, 532 U.S. 
at 32. 
 105. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32-33. 
 106. 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
 107. 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), rev’d by 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
 108. Interestingly, the Tiger Woods decision was released three and one-half months after the 
Supreme Court’s Moseley decision, even though it had been argued in September 2001.  The delay 
is noteworthy, and not unexpected under the circumstances. 
 109. See Antioch Co. v. W. Trimming Corp., 347 F.3d 150 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 110. Id. at 154. 
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to the Lanham Act.  Whatever the reason, such questionable cases gave 
the Sixth Circuit and our district courts reason to be cautious in 
enforcing our clients’ legitimate trademark rights. 
So has the Sixth Circuit abandoned trademark and right of publicity 
law?  Unfortunately, at least for now, the answer is yes.  With Tiger 
Woods not having been appealed, and with the Supreme Court having 
thoroughly repudiated the Sixth Circuit’s view of trade dress in TrafFix, 
it appears unlikely that this court has any interest in having another 
trademark or trade dress case reviewed by the Supreme Court.  And with 
the Supreme Court’s 9-0 reversal of the Sixth Circuit in the spring of 
2003 in the Moseley dilution case, it is not surprising that our circuit is 
now very wary of trademark cases and any related cases protecting such 
rights. 
All is not lost.  Perhaps some lawyers will hesitate before they 
bring suits that attempt to use trademark law to stop lawful competition.  
Indeed, perhaps it is even time to again consider another substantive 
review and amendment of the Lanham Act.  While Congress cannot 
overrule the First Amendment, it can restate its belief in strong 
trademark law, and even consider a Federal Right of Publicity Statute.  
Whatever means we choose, we have the ability to begin the debate.  
Unquestionably, this is a subject that now needs to be thoroughly 
discussed, and lawyers have a responsibility to conduct their practices in 
a way that moves the courts and/or Congress to protect legitimate 
trademark and publicity rights. 
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